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Abstract 
Twenty years after its foundation, MERCOSUR has failed to meet its declared goals. Far from being a 
common market and not yet a customs union, it has neither deepened nor (legally) enlarged. All the 
other regionalist projects in Latin America fare even worse, although they have arguably fostered 
domestic democracy, economic reforms and more peaceful regional relations. This paper introduces a 
conceptual toolkit for comparing regional integration, and then applies it to explain the dispersed goals 
and declining performance of the Latin American experiences. The aim is to show how the 
strengthening of national sovereignty – as opposed to its pooling or delegation – is at the heart of most 
contemporary regionalist strategies. 
Keywords 
Comparative regional integration, regionalism, Latin America, Mercosur. 
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Introduction 
In the 1960s, the first wave of Latin American integration was partly fostered by the rising threat of a 
fortress Europe and the need to join forces to confront it. In the 1990s, however, the European Union 
(EU) had become both a model and a partner for a new wave of regional organizations that included, 
prominently, the Andean Community (CAN according to its Spanish acronym) and the Common 
Market of the South (Mercosur). But by showing the limits and dangers of ill-designed regional 
institutions, the current crisis of European integration has dealt a blow to the belief that pooling 
sovereignty is the necessary way ahead for nation states. Yet, political activity on a regional basis still 
commands a great deal of attention from chief executives and foreign policy elites worldwide. This 
article approaches the evolution of regionalism with two aims in mind: first, to clarify key concepts 
and refine analytical categories; and second, to apply these concepts and categories to contemporary 
Latin American experiences with integration in order to evaluate their performance and prospects. 
On concepts and paradigmatic debates 
In the field of political science and international relations, two broad strands of literature have 
developed to account for the voluntary clustering of independent states into regional groupings. In 
chronological order, the first christened its subject matter as “regional integration” and has focused 
mainly on Europe since the late 1950s (Haas 1958); the second strand opted for a fuzzier label, namely 
regionalism, and since the 1990s has focused on all continents – though only marginally on Europe 
(Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999: Hettne and Söderbaum 1998). The focus on Europe of the former 
strand does not mean that the forerunners of integration studies lacked comparative ambitions, as early 
works on Latin America show (Haas 1967; Haas and Schmitter 1964); rather, integration processes 
failed to take root and were only consolidated in Europe, stagnating or receding elsewhere. 
The first problem faced by those who study comparative regional integration is not empirical or 
theoretical, but conceptual. Unlike pioneering masterpieces such as those produced by Nye (1968), 
Claude (1971) or Lindberg (1963), too many contemporary studies suffer from conceptual stretching 
or fuzziness or both. Although most authors usually provide some kind of definition for the 
phenomenon they analyze, few do so in a satisfactory manner. Thus, most definitions are either too 
vague or too ambiguous. Take, for example, the influential characterization by Hettne and Söderbaum 
(1998: 7): “New regionalism is a comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional process, 
implying the change of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with 
regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and 
political regimes”. In this definition, analytical categories are explicitly non-exhaustive, implicitly 
non-exclusive, and are not ranked by precedence or hierarchy. This cannot plausibly produce 
measurable indicators and testable hypotheses. Hettne and Söderbaum (1998: 9) further define 
regionalization as “increasing levels of ‘regionness’, namely the process whereby a geographical 
region is transformed from a passive object to a subject with a capacity to articulate the interests of the 
emerging region” (emphasis added). Here, confusion reaches new heights, as the word region is used 
simultaneously to connote objective geography and subjective interests, as well as an existing object 
and an emerging entity. Hegel’s distinction between in sich and für sich is a wonderful philosophical 
insight, but modern scholarship requires different names for different things, clear definitions and 
concepts that can be rendered operational. 
A way out of conceptual stretching and fuzziness consists of understanding contemporary 
regionalism as an umbrella expression that covers a multiplicity of distinct phenomena. Andrew 
Hurrell (1995) enumerates five of these, arguing that none should be given the exclusive rights to use 
the term: (a) regionalization, (b) regional awareness and identity, (c) regional interstate cooperation, 
(d) state-promoted regional integration, and (e) regional cohesion. The first – regionalization – can be 
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understood as social or economic interdependence, which is usually the outcome of informal, market-
driven processes. The second – regional identity – conveys a cultural rather than a political or 
economic notion. The common feature of both phenomena is that neither is necessarily intended but is 
brought about by uncoordinated factors – such as increasing trade or migration flows or common 
historical roots. The following three subtypes respond to a different logic: they are either the outcome 
of formal state decisions – cooperation and integration – or a consequence of such decisions – regional 
cohesion. While cooperation entails voluntary compliance, integration requires some degree of 
sovereignty transfer, which discourages unilateral withdrawal and raises the costs of process reversion. 
In these subtypes, Hurrell (1995: 44) claims, “the region plays a defining role in the relations between 
the states (and other major actors) of that region and the rest of the world”, while constituting “the 
organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues” (emphasis added). This 
definition also uses the same concept simultaneously for an actor and an arena: here, the region “plays 
a role” regarding “policy within the region”. Such ubiquitous confusion is arguably rooted in the 
nominalization of the adjective regional. This word, however, “indicates scope, not substance” 
(Malamud 2010: 654). The latter should be conveyed by a noun, which can either be a process 
(integration) or an entity (organization). To give an example, Europe is an intelligibly but highly 
ambiguous noun that should not be collapsed with European integration or with the European Union. 
In these two expressions, “integration” and “union” are nouns while “European” becomes an adjective 
that delimits a particular range of otherwise general phenomena. 
So what is regional integration? Regardless of time, Haas’s (1971: 6) definition is sufficiently clear 
and parsimonious to serve as a point of departure: a “process of how and why nation states voluntarily 
mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while 
acquiring new techniques for resolving conflicts among themselves”. To this, Schmitter (2004) has 
conveniently added, “by creating common and permanent institutions capable of making decisions 
binding on all members”. Contrary to common usage in Latin American politics, where after any 
international dispute statesmen rush to declare that “the conflict is over, now it is time for integration”, 
the opposite of conflict is not integration but cooperation. Actually, integration is just a subset of 
cooperation – and not the most successful or even the most frequent. Nor is regional integration just 
increasing trade flows (aka regionalization) or the various manifestations of Deutsch et al’s 
conceptualization (1957) such as recurrent contacts among elites, facilitating communication between 
or meetings among people across national borders, or even promoting symbols of common identity. 
Although there is nothing in the above definition that gives the economy primacy over other 
domains, the fact is that really existing integration attempts have regularly adopted economic goals, 
whether efficiency gains through benefits of scale or joint development through cooperation and 
solidarity. As regards the market dimension, there are four progressive levels of achievement (Balassa 
1961). The simplest, the free-trade zone, is an area in which domestic obstacles to trade are 
dismantled; this means that customs tariffs are not imposed on the products of any member country. A 
customs union takes things one step further: at this stage a common external tariff is established, fixing 
the amount that products coming from the rest of the world have to pay to enter the area. This implies 
that the member countries form a single entity in the arena of international trade. The third step, a 
common or single market, is a customs union to which the free mobility of productive factors between 
the member countries and a common trade policy are added. It contemplates the coordination of 
sectoral macro-economic policies among its members and requires the harmonization of national 
legislation. Fourth, an economic union appends centralized monetary institutions and common 
financial policies to the single market. It goes beyond simple coordination and harmonization among 
the member countries, and includes the establishment of unified supranational agencies – such as a 
central bank – and a single currency. Fiscal coordination is also required, as the Euro crisis has made 
clear. 
Regardless of the economic goals of regional integration, the necessity of establishing some kind of 
common institutional arrangements fosters non-economic linkages. Higher levels of state-promoted 
Overlapping Regionalism, No Integration: Conceptual Issues and the Latin American Experiences 
3 
economic integration are likely to increase flows of trade and investment, i.e. growing regionalization 
in the sense of the first subtype defined by Hurrell. Likewise, increasing flows of people and 
communications can nurture a regional awareness, as in the second subtype. Although none of these 
means regional integration as defined above, they may create further demands for it, a mechanism that 
the neo-functionalist literature calls spillover.
1
 Spillover is the unintended process whereby integration 
between states in one sector creates incentives for integration in further sectors in order to fully 
capture the benefits of integration in the original sector. 
Just like the development of capitalism and the emergence of the bourgeoisie created the need for 
larger markets, which in turn led to the consolidation of the nation-state, the effects of economic 
integration spill over into the political arena and foster new political centers that command authority 
over larger territories. This is why regional integration can be compared to the historical process of 
state building, even though the former is voluntary while the latter has seldom been so. As both 
processes aim at the creation of a larger political community, they feature a common foundational 
nature. This stands in contrast to normal-time politics, when organizational apparatuses are devoted to 
daily administration. The EU case is illustrative: as it consolidated as a political community, its 
management gradually became “business as usual” and the scholarly focus moved from integration to 
governance – and from international relations to comparative politics (Hix 1994). Hence, the EU 
started to be compared more with federal states and less with other international organizations. As it 
happened, the nature of the beast changed from polity-making to policy-making. Lately, though, the 
Euro crisis has re-equilibrated the weight of the two dimensions. 
Integration can develop in two ways. Negative integration refers to the dismantling of national 
barriers on trade and the prohibition of discriminatory behavior, while positive integration implies 
common policies that shape the conditions under which markets operate (Scharpf 1996). This 
distinction between market-creating and market-regulating functions is significant because the former 
may be attained through intergovernmental proceedings, while the latter requires enforcement by 
supranational agencies and rules. Since negative and positive integration are generally sequential, the 
use of this criterion supports the view of those who see the passage of intergovernmentalism to 
supranationalism as progressive over time; be that as it may, progressive does not mean irreversible. 
Irrespective of its degree of formal supranationality, a regional organization may tend to privilege 
either the authority of impersonal institutions or the decision of specific power-holders. The 
orientation of a given organization in this regard is more a function of the state-society nexus of the 
(larger) member states rather than of the regional constitution or legal system (Söderbaum and Sbragia 
2010). The consequence is that some blocs may be mainly rule-oriented while others remain more 
power-oriented. 
A further distinction regards integration and convergence. The former means that member-states 
get ever closer, while the latter conveys they become more similar. As an example, Greece is more 
integrated with Germany – e.g. they share a common currency and military affiliation within NATO – 
than Norway with Sweden, yet the latter pair features more similarities in political, economic, and 
social terms or in any other significant indicators. 
International organizations may perform three roles (Archer 2001): they can serve as arenas for 
dialogue and cooperation, they can be used as instruments by other actors (especially their member 
states), and they can assume an independent identity as actors in pursuit of their own objectives – a 
property called actorness. These roles are non-exclusive and convey increasing complexity. 
Integration only starts beyond the second one. 
                                                     
1
 Neofunctionalism is an approach that was originally developed by Ernst Haas (1958; 1964) to explain processes of 
international integration such as the European Coal and Steel Community and the International Labor Organization. 
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There are three sets of conditions for a process of regional integration to develop: demand, supply 
(Mattli 1999), and inertial factors. Demand conditions emerge from higher levels of regional 
interdependence, as transnational transactors perceive that cross-border activities are too costly and 
call on national or supranational authorities to lower transactions costs through cooperation, 
coordination and, eventually, integration. Supply conditions refer to regional leadership, understood as 
the capacity and will of one or more actors either to pay a disproportionate share of the costs required 
by the regional undertaking or to undertake monitoring, enforcement and brokerage. Inertial 
conditions take the form of demand or supply conditions that become institutionalized, locking in 
previous agreements and creating path-dependent effects that may protect integration processes in 
times of declining demand or supply conditions – but may also make them too rigid. 
Although some could judge the arguments presented so far as Euro-centric, the goal is precisely the 
opposite: to provide tools to understand regionalism in different world areas without either equalizing 
them or considering them incommensurable. Integration should be understood as, 
“a potentially global phenomenon, and thus one that should be recognized whenever it appears. 
This calls for standard definitions and theory that can travel. Think of democracy: there are as 
many types thereof as there are countries in which citizens are formally equal and rulers are 
accountable; yet, lacking these characteristics, we do not call it a democracy. The same applies to 
regional integration: either there are sovereign states that voluntarily transfer parcels of 
sovereignty to joint decision-making or there are not, and in this case we do not call it integration. 
We have resisted the temptation to stretch conceptual definitions or dispose of working theories 
when a given phenomenon does not turn out as expected, as long as those concepts and theories 
are capable of explaining why this happened. EU lessons are useful to understand South American 
travails with regional integration precisely because they can also make sense of non-integration – 
instead of calling it otherwise and pretending that it is a new animal” (Malamud and Schmitter 
2011: 155). 
Since geographic vicinity is constant, neighborhood spillovers are unavoidable and their joint 
management appears as a reasonable goal. However, the means for achieving it are diverse and not 
determined by historical legacies or globalization pressures. In recent years, different forms of 
regional interaction other than integration have developed worldwide, and several approaches were 
developed that replicated the complexification of reality with fuzziness and ambiguity at the analytical 
level. But our analytical categories have fizzled out and are failing to call things by their name. It is 
time to call a spade a spade, to streamline our conceptual toolkit and apply it to the empirical field. 
On Latin America’s obsession with regionalism and misadventures with integration 
Latin American attempts at regionalism have never converged into a single project. The first wave, 
following the Western European experiment with coal and steel and either supported or neglected by 
the United States, included two mutually exclusive blocs: the Central American Common Market and 
the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC).
2
 Subsequent experiences as the Andean 
Community and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) also included small subsets of countries, 
giving rise to a long-lasting patchwork of segmented regionalisms. Today, there are a few associations 
that encompasses several subregional blocs or even the whole subcontinent, such as the Union of 
South American States (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
(CELAC); but the former brings together only half of the Latin American states while the latter lacks 
legal status, organizational structure and institutional authority. 
                                                     
2
 Both organizations were founded in 1960. CACM initially brought together El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua but soon expanded to include Costa Rica, while ALALC comprised 11 states: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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UNASUR is a Brazil-sponsored regional cooperation agreement, masterminded for the unspoken 
goal of carving out a Brazilian sphere of influence by cutting off US influence and offsetting Mexican 
competition for leadership. It contemplates the promotion of physical integration through transport, 
energy and communication networks, but it does not envision any transfer of sovereignty. 
Accordingly, it should be considered as a tool for top-level dialogue and political coordination, but not 
an integration attempt. 
Although CELAC acts as the EU counterpart in EU-Latin America and the Caribbean meetings, 
which bring together 60 states (27 European plus 33 from LAC), the fact is that these meetings long 
predated its creation. CELAC is a hollow container that regional powers use to signal policy positions 
or to wave ideological banners such as anti-American sentiment or South-South solidarity. It is also 
one more arena for states to trade their differences and for head of governments to build mutual trust, 
but it is not – and has no prospects of becoming – an international actor. And, to be sure, nor is it an 
integration project. 
In the last decade, a further type of regionalism purportedly has been identified: post-liberal or 
post-hegemonic regionalism (Sanahuja 2009; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012). The argument is that the 
new construct has shifted the focus away from economics and, by lambasting the failure of neo-liberal 
reforms, features a more ideological (aka progressive) stance. Policy coordination and common 
identities come to the fore as market and investment relations recede. The topmost examples of this 
kind o regionalism are UNASUR and the Venezuelan-sponsored Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of our America (ALBA). These undertakings discursively reject the neo-functionalist premise that 
integration is driven by a convergence of interests rather than ideological commonalities. However, a 
backlash is underway, as Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico have signed a treaty to establish a Pacific 
Alliance that – once again – puts the economy first. Its goal is to foster free trade and market 
integration in opposition to the ideological radicalization of Latin American regionalism (Malamud 
and Gardini 2012: 120). Yet, this grouping has a political impact worth considering as it challenges 
Brazil’s putative leadership by bringing Mexico back into the region, out-performing Mercosur and 
diluting UNASUR. 
The segmented nature of Latin American regionalism is not always competitive but frequently 
overlapping, as shown by the figure attached. Of the nine blocs featured in the maps, one feature 
stands out:  
“not one country participates in at least half of them. In the Western hemisphere, regionalism is 
always sub-regional and there is no common core or political centre. The reality is that, every time 
a new bloc is born, it does so by excluding neighbouring countries and by intentionally 
differentiating itself from other (sub)regional organisations. Decentred sub-regionalisms rather 
than concentric regionalism has been the end-product of such logic, by which sub-regional 
integration proceeds through regional or hemispheric disintegration” (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 
120). 
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Latin America: segmented regionalism 
 
 
 
   
  
 
From top left, by row: (1) the Americas, (2) Latin America, (3) ALBA, (4) North America (NAFTA), (5) Central 
America (SICA), (6) South America (UNASUR), (7) Mercosur, (8) Andean Community, and (9) Pacific 
Alliance. Source: Malamud and Gardini (2012: 122). 
As argued above, integration was not pursued by all these regional undertakings, but it was explicitly 
promised by some of them. However, it has not been delivered by any of them – barring partial and 
usually reversed achievements. The case of Mercosur, which used to be seen as the most successful 
and promising experience of Latin American integration, offers an eloquent illustration of the 
transformations brought about by meager results and changing goals. 
If the success of an organization is measured by the attainment of the goals established in its 
treaties, Mercosur is an outright failure. After more than twenty years, it is neither a common market 
nor even a customs union. Worse, it does not work as an effective free trade zone, since unilateral 
tariff restrictions are erected at will and non-tariff barriers abound. Chile has not applied for 
membership as the founders expected, and chains of value and regional industrial complexes have 
only developed outside the scope of the treaties – as in the automobile sectoral agreement between 
Argentina and Brazil. It would be unfair to ignore that Mercosur has accomplished other 
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commendable goals such as facilitating the transitions to democracy, locking in domestic economic 
reforms and consolidating a regional security community. But these did not require the transfer of 
sovereignty and can therefore be regarded as the result of cooperation rather than integration. 
One of the few aspects that makes Mercosur look as if it works is legal international actorness. 
Unlike the Andean Community, fifteen years after they began, Mercosur is still negotiating with the 
EU as a bloc. However, it is Brazil on its own that sits at top international tables such as the BRICS 
(largest emerging economies), IBSA (largest Southern hemisphere democracies), BASIC (emerging 
economies environmental coalition), and the WTO 4-party final-negotiations group, not to speak of its 
bid to occupy a permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council against Argentina’s will (Malamud 
2011).  
Finally, the only case of enlargement has led to a political conflict over the suspension of Paraguay 
to allow the ratification of Venezuela’s accession. The rift created a legal limbo regarding the status of 
the two members and the validity of the legislation decided during the exclusion of Paraguay, as this 
contradicts the unanimity decision rule and therefore puts into question Paraguay’s future commitment 
to abide by the rules. 
Mercosur is a case of supply-side integration, as the political decision to establish the organization 
was not made in response to previous economic interdependence or societal demands. Its key working 
mechanism has been called interpresidentialism, meaning the outcome of combining an international 
strategy, namely presidential diplomacy, with a domestic institution, namely presidentialism 
(Malamud 2005a). Presidential diplomacy is the customary use of direct negotiations between national 
presidents rather than professional diplomats every time a crucial decision has to be made or a critical 
conflict needs to be solved. In turn, presidentialism South American style grants chief executives the 
power to strike deals without seeking approval by either parliaments or cabinets. The consequence of 
this combination is that Mercosur has been power-oriented rather than rule-oriented from its inception. 
Accordingly, the legalization or judicialization of the bloc’s procedures is nothing more than a 
myth. Its top dispute settlement institutions have been called upon 16 times in 20 years. Legal 
institution-building, as manifested by the establishment of the so-called Permanent Review Tribunal in 
2006, was not undertaken in response to functional needs but rather because of the pressure of 
epistemic communities and transnational networks: blunt simplification – jobs for lawyers (and 
judges) – serves to convey the point. 
Likewise, the development of a parliamentary institution has been an outcome of professional 
lobbying by academics and national lawmakers, but also a legitimizing resource born out of mimicry 
and isomorphism (Rüland and Bechle 2011). The marketplace of ideas about regional integration is 
much limited to a single successful source, the EU. In fact, Parlasur has no legislative competences, no 
oversight capacities, is not demographically proportional, and has virtually no transnational party 
politics. 
The distinctiveness of Mercosur vis-à-vis other regional projects such as UNASUR or ALBA 
continues to be its treaty-based focus on market issues. Yet, few advances have been made regarding 
policy coordination and harmonization, and the threshold between cooperation and integration has 
been hardly crossed. The only discipline that the bloc has effectively imposed upon its members is the 
prohibition to unilaterally sign trade agreements, a competence that was transferred to the regional 
level – only to be gloomily underutilized. 
The main reason for this underachievement was identified a decade ago, in what remains the most 
in-depth analysis of the bloc to date. In the view of its authors, Mercosur’s underlying formula, i.e. 
preferential access to the Brazilian market in exchange for Argentine support for Brazilian 
international strategies (Bouzas et al 2002), has exhausted and never replaced its fuel. Thus, Mercosur 
acquired a different meaning for each member state, and national strategies have become disparate 
rather than coordinated. 
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For Brazil, Mercosur no longer performs a significant economic role, as extra-regional partners 
dominate trade relations and regional investment is agreed bilaterally with each neighbor. Somewhat 
ironically, both progressive activists such as Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2012) and pragmatic 
analysts such as Alfredo Valladão (2006) agree that Brazil’s promotion of UNASUR imperils 
Mercosur’s objectives and operation. However, the latter also serves a political purpose: to help 
manage relations with Argentina, the only regional country that could seriously challenge or hinder 
Brazil’s global projection.3  
By contrast, Mercosur has economic significance for Argentina insofar as Brazil is its largest 
trading partner (for Brazil, China and the US are larger partners than Argentina). However, cars are 
the key commercial link between the two countries, the trade in which is covered by an administered 
trade regime that falls outside the free trade zone. Argentina also uses the bloc for unspoken political 
goals such as tying Brazil to the region and preventing it from doing business or going global alone. 
Former Brazilian foreign minister Celso Lafer once said that, for Brazil, negotiating the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas was an option while Mercosur was its destiny. Paraphrasing Lafer, it could be 
said that, for Paraguay, Mercosur is not its destiny but its doom: unavoidable, though not necessarily a 
good thing. Landlocked, the country cannot afford to be left out of an association in which its two 
coastal neighbors participate. And yet its recent suspension from the bloc because of an alleged coup 
puts it in the worst of two worlds: it pays the club’s dues but gets no perks of membership. 
By having direct access to the sea, Uruguay is less dependent on Mercosur than Paraguay. 
Nonetheless, the country’s birth as a buffer state still resonates in the present, and offending any of its 
larger neighbors by leaving the bloc could set off painful retaliations. Because leaving can be costlier 
than staying, strategic patience and institutional inertia have carried the day. Additionally, the current 
left-of-center administration tends to stand up for the bloc on ideological grounds. 
After six years of standoff, Venezuelan membership was finally approved for reasons of political 
expedience, as the suspension of Paraguay by decision of three foreign presidents (i.e. Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay) substituted for the congressional ratification of the accession protocol. However, 
as a few days later the Senate turned the protocol down, Venezuela’s status might remain controversial 
once Paraguay is readmitted. In any case, for an economy as uncompetitive as the Venezuelan the 
rationale for belonging to the bloc is not related to trade but to the international legitimization of its 
“revolutionary regime” and to stave off perceived threats from the US. 
In sum, Mercosur is not what it purports to be in the official discourse; rather, it is several different 
things depending on who is asked. Its balance sheet is positive given the indirect effects of upholding 
domestic democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, but the gap between words and deeds 
may end up definitely damaging its reputation and jeopardizing its usefulness. Should empty rhetoric 
definitely gain the upper hand, Mercosur may survive but serve no further collective purpose. Indeed, 
really existing regional integration is not what it was once thought to be. 
Conclusions 
In Latin America, regionalism has evolved through segmented proliferation rather than enlargement, 
and through goal-transformation rather than goal-attainment. The reasons for these unexpected 
developments can be summarized as follows. 
First, economic facts trump political will. National economies are non-complementary and 
outward-oriented, imposing a low ceiling on potential gains from integration – as Burges (2005) has 
shown. Might any institutional arrangement compensate for this shortcoming? 
                                                     
3
 As suggested by Alfredo Valladão at the conference “Mercosur at 20: Politics and Economics in the Southern Cone”, The 
Latin American Centre, University of Oxford, 11th March 2011. 
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The answer to the above question is negative, as form has trumped function. Institutional deficits as 
in MERCOSUR or institutional precociousness or “surplus” as in CAN have prevented functional 
spillover from taking place (Malamud and Schmitter 2011). So what about pragmatic fixes? 
These fixes have not worked either, as ideology has gradually trumped pragmatism. Departing 
from its initial simplicity, Mercosur, which had originally learned more lessons from the CAN failure 
than from the EU success, has increasingly become largely rhetorical (Malamud 2005b; Doctor 2012). 
As the results show, though, programmatic affinity and identity politics is no substitute for the 
convergence of interests. 
Today’s landscape of Latin American integration looks like Jean Monnet’s blueprint upside down: 
rather than “petits pas, grands effets”, the reality reflects “grands mots, petits effets”. But why talk 
about integration if it does not deliver? 
For some groups and observers, regional organizations – especially Mercosur – have become an 
existential end per se rather than a means to an end. Just as citizens are expected to defend their 
country without questioning its raison d’être, inchoate regional identity rather than interests or 
reasoning are frequently at the root of the defense of regional would-be polities – a suggestive 
constructivist turn. For others, usually including scholars, politicians and bureaucrats, regional 
organizations offer attractive opportunities to make a living: a new discipline for scholarly 
specialization, good salaries in region-funded contracts, academic and political tourism, and the 
prestige of belonging to a small group of iniziati. In this case, it is not identity or advantage arising 
from dismantling state borders but rather particularistic interests that lie behind the defense of 
regionalism. For their part, statesmen know that sovereignty is not relinquished by signing papers so 
they are free to continue to establish and relaunch regional organizations without integrating anything, 
and they can use regionalism as a foreign policy resource to achieve other ends such as international 
visibility, regional stability and regime legitimacy (Merke 2010; Spektor 2010). 
Expressions such as “token integration’ (Nye 1968: 377), “ceremonial regionalism” (Montesinos 
1996), and “integration-fiction” (Peña 1996) have been coined to portray Latin American integration, 
with its combination of high-toned rhetoric and dismal performances. It often seems that decision-
makers and their followers want to talk integration into existence. However absurd this may appear, 
this behavior is far from unreasonable, since politicians know that praising integration gets them 
support, while actually engaging in it would have material costs. Thus, talking without doing is not 
necessarily a sign of corruption, ignorance or cultural atavism: given the dim conditions for Latin 
American integration, it is simply a rational decision. 
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